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I.

INTRODUCTION

The phrase "scenes a faire" probably owes its origin to the
nineteenth century drama critic Francisque Sarcey. Although Sarcey
never provided a strict definition, 1 he used the phrase to mean an
"obligatory scene," one the public "has been permitted to foresee and
a scene can never
to desire from the progress of the action; and such
'2
be omitted without a consequent dissatisfaction.

© 1989 by Leslie A. Kurtz
*Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. B.A., 1967, Brown University; M.A.,
1970, New York University; J.D., 1974, Columbia University. The author would like to acknowledge the help received from research assistant Andrea Ingram.
1. W. ARCHER, PLAY-MAKING, A MANUAL OF CRAFTSMANSHIP 147 (1960).
2. C. HAMILTON, PROBLEMS OF THE PLAYWRIGHT 56 (1917). It has been defined in P.
ROBERT, DICTIONNAIRE ALPHABETIQUE ET ANALOGIQUE DE LA LANGUE FRANCAIS 353

(1966) as 'la scene importante, qu'on attend, d'apres la logique de raction" (the important scene
you wait for according to the logic of the action); see also W. ARCHER, supra note 1, at 148
(the obligatory scene, according to Sarcey, is one which, for one reason or another, an audience
expects and ardently desires).
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Examples best explain Sarcey's understanding of the phrase. In
Corneille's "Cinna," Cinna conspires against the Roman Emperor Augustus, who learns of the conspiracy and pardons him. Sarcey identified two scenes a faire.3 One is the pardon scene, the climax of the
play. The other is a scene in which Augustus debates between revenge
and pardon. These scenes carry the drama. Without them, there is
no tragedy, but only a formless, nameless work. In another scene
from "Cinna," Augustus consults two friends, both heads of the conspiracy against him. One pleads for the Republic, the other for the
Empire. This is not a scene a faire, because Corneille could have
devised another scene in which to introduce and create sympathy for
Augustus. The scene is an important but not essential part of the
drama.
In 1942, Judge Yankwich, a California federal district court judge,
introduced the phrase "scenes a faire" into United States copyright
law. In Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 4 the plaintiff claimed that a
church sequence appearing in the motion picture 'Wrhen Tomorrow
Comes" was an infringing copy of a similar scene from his novel
"Serenade." In both the film and the novel, two lovers spent an idyllic
night in a church choir loft, where they sought shelter from a storm.
Judge Yankwich said the small details from events that took place in
the church in both works, such as playing the piano, prayer, and
hunger, were inherent in the situation itself.
They are what the French call "scenes a faire." Once having
placed two persons in a church during a big storm, it was
inevitable that incidents like these . . . should force themselves upon the writer in developing the theme. Courts have
held repeatedly that such similarities and incidental details
necessary to the environment or setting of an action are not
the material of which copyrightable originality consists.3
Judge Yankwich did not use the phrase "scenes a faire" in the
same way as Sarcey. He focused on details rather than on scenes
central to the action of the play. Nor were these details obligatory in
Sarcey's sense of the word. Although they flowed naturally from the

3.

F. SARCEY, III HISTOIRE DU THEATRE DEPUIS CINQUANTE ANs 35-41 (1900).

4. 47 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
5. Id. at 1017; see Yanklwich, Originalityin the Law of Intellectual Property, 11 F.R.D.
457, 462 (1951) ("[Wihen you are dealing with a common idea, no matter how different the
treatment may be, common elements will appear in both products . .

.

. [S]imilarities may

appear which are inherent in a situation. The French refer to them as scenes a faire, - that
is, scenes which must follow a certain situation.") (emphasis in original).
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situation, other details could have been used without changing the
nature of the play or leaving the audience dissatisfied.
Courts have not precisely defined scenes a faire. In Alexander v.
Haley,, they were defined as "incidents, characters or settings which
are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the
treatment of a given topic."' 7 Many courts have used this definition, 8
which includes the two major strands of the scenes a faire doctrine.
The first is that there are scenes which "must" be included in a given
context, because identical situations call for identical scenes. The second is that certain scenes are standard or "stock" - the common
stock of literary composition. In either context, scenes a faire are

considered unprotected by copyright. 9

6. 460 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
7. Id. at 45.
8. Other cases using the Alexander v. Haley definition of scenes a faire include Atari, Inc.
v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir.) (quoting Alexander,
460 F. Supp. at 45), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982)); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Steinberg v. Columbia
Pictures, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (quoting Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc.,
615 F. Supp. 430, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)), affd, 784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159
(1986); Anderson v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1, 2 (C.D. Cal. 1985) ("incidents,
characters, or settings that naturally flow from or are standard to the treatment of certain
ideas and themes"); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 430, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
("incidents, characters, or settings which, as a practical matter, are indispensable or standard
in the treatment of a given topic"), affd, 784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159
(1986); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 615 F. Supp. 838, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(quoting Alexander, 460 F. Supp. at 45); see Frybarger v. International Business Machs., 812
F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Atari, 672 F.2d at 616). For other definitions, see infra
notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
9. Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1987); Whelan Assocs., Inc.
v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987);
Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986);
Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985); Landsberg v.
Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037
(1984); See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1983); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Reyher v. Children's Television
Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); Evans v. Wallace Berrie &
Co., 681 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Wavelength Film Co. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.,
631 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Zambito v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 613 F. Supp. 1107
(E.D.N.Y.), offd, 788 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1985); Overman v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 605 F.
Supp. 350 (C.D. Cal. 1984), affd, 767 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1985); Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F.
Supp. 1297 (S.D.N.Y.), offd, 738 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World,
Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981); Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1981), affd,
698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982); Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Midwood
v. Paramount Picture Corp., 1981 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 25,292 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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The meaning of scenes a faire has strayed far afield from the one
Sarcey gave it. Courts today tend to use it as a catch-phrase, a term
recited in place of thoughtful analysis. They have not considered carefully what scenes a faire are, why they should be unprotectible, or
what "unprotectible" means. Their opinions provide little helpful
reasoning beyond general references to the distinction between ideas
and expression, often referred to as the "idea/expression dichotomy.' ' 1
This article will first discuss the idea/expression dichotomy, which
provides a background for understanding scenes a faire. It will then
consider the nature of scenes a faire and what it means to say that
a scene is indispensable or necessary. Finally, it will discuss why
scenes a faire should be considered unprotectible, and the appropriate
meaning of "unprotectible" in that context.
II.

THE IDEAIEXPRESSION DICHOTOMY

Any original work of authorship that exists in tangible form is
copyrightable - subject to protection under copyright. 1 Copyright
protection, however, extends only to the particular expression of the
ideas contained within the work, not to the ideas themselves. 12 As
Justice Brandeis said, "the noblest of human productions - knowledge,
truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas - become, after voluntary
communication to others, free as the air to common use." 13 A playwright cannot, for example, obtain exclusive rights to the idea of
feuding Irish and Jewish families whose children marry and produce
grandchildren, leading to reconciliation. 14 Nor will copyright give an
artist the exclusive right to paint two cardinals on the branches of a
blossoming apple tree.' s

10. See infra notes 11-35 and accompanying text.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
12. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1983); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977); Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd
Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 363 (9th Cir. 1947); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121
(2d Cir. 1930); Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926). This principle, which developed
in case law, has been codified in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982): "In no case does copyright protection
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea ... regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."
13. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
14. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
15. See Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
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Ideas are far too broad and general to be subject to monopoly
control. An idea ordinarily encompasses many means of expression.
If an author could gain control over an idea simply by expressing it
in one form, then the stock of raw materials available to other authors
would be diminished. As each copyright was obtained, the areas of
thought open to discussion and development would be progressively
narrowed. 16 Subsequent writers would be barred from too large a
precinct. 17 Creativity and the exchange of thought would be impeded

rather than encouraged.
The distinction between ideas and expressionis provides a way of
reconciling two competing interests - the interest in rewarding ingenuity and the interest in allowing the public to benefit from new
works by other authors on the same subject. 19 The function of copyright
is to promote creativity and the dissemination of creative works, so
that the public may benefit from the labor of authors. 20 Copyright
provides authors with an incentive to create by granting them the
21
exclusive right to profit from and control specified uses of their works.
Copyright, however, also has the capacity to diminish the potential
for creativity. These exclusive rights may hinder the efforts of new
authors who seek to build on the creativity of the past.22 The idea/ex16. Eicbel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). Indeed, protecting ideas under
copyright might create constitutional problems, as it would undercut the first amendment interest
in the free exchange of ideas. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
555-60 (198.5).
17. B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 47 (1967).
18. The distinction between idea and expression is not always an easy one to make. See
infra notes 23-34 and accompanying text.
19. Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(rationale for copyright protection must reconcile two competing social interests, namely "rewarding individual ingenuity, and nevertheless allowing progress and improvements based on the
same subject matter by others than the original author"); see Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy
Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 912 (2d Cir. 1980); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d
87, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
20. See REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW 3-6 (quoted in A. LATMiAN, R. GORMAN & J. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR
THE EIGHTIES 13 (1985)).
21. These include reproduction, performance, and the preparation of derivative works. 17
U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (exclusive rights in copyrighted works); see Warner Bros., Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) ("By assuring the author of an original
work the exclusive benefits of whatever commercial success his or her work enjoys, the law
obviously promotes creativity.").
22. See Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 139, 140 (1785) ("[W]e must take care to guard
against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their
time for the service of the community may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward
of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements,
nor the progress of the arts retarded.").
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pression dichotomy helps copyright strike a balance between providing
incentives to create and maintaining the store of raw materials needed
for new creations.
Although the boundary between unprotectible ideas and protectible

expression is important, it is often difficult to draw.2 When copying
is literal, an idea can easily be isolated from its expression. If the
defendant makes an exact copy of the plaintiffs work, or some major
portion of it, expression has clearly been taken. The same is true even
if the defendant's copy is not exact, but contains merely colorable
variations. The expression found in the plaintiffs words is distinguish-

able from the abstract idea expressed by those words.
Of course, copyright protects against more than verbatim or near
verbatim copying.2 An author may infringe by appropriating the action
of a play or novel, even if none of the words are taken.2' To prove
infringement, a plaintiff must show that the defendant copied the
plaintiffs work, and that the copying went so far as to constitute

improper appropriation.2 6 The plaintiff usually accomplishes this by
showing that the defendant's work is substantially similar to the plain-

tiffs. 27 Substantial similarity exists "if the fundamental essence or
structure of one work is duplicated in another." Although an author
who copies the basic plot or theme of a work takes only an unprotectible idea, one who copies the patterning and arrangement of events
and the interplay of characters commits an actionable taking of expression. In what has become known as the "abstractions" test, Judge
Learned Hand said:

In some works, ideas and expression are more easily distinguishable than in others.
Newton will survive at least as long as Homer, but the Newton that will survive,
the essential Newton, is not the language in which he described his theories and
findings but the theories and findings themselves. The essence of Homer, on the
other hand, cannot be detached from his language.
Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351, 1376 (1986).
24. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (protection "cannot
be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations").
25. See Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
26. Essentially, infringement requires ownership of the copyright by the plaintiff and copying by the defendant. In the absence of direct proof, the plaintiff will seek to establish copying
by showing that the defendant had access to her work and that there is substantial similarity
between the two works. 3 M. NIAMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01 (1988). Substantial
similarity is also used to determine whether the "copying went so far as to constitute improper
appropriation .... ." Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975); see Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
27. For a discussion of copying and improper appropriation, see supra note 26.
28. 3 M. NIAIMER, supra note 26, § 13.03(A)(1).
23.
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Upon any work. .. a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the
incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than
the most general statement of what the [work] is about, and
at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point
in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use
of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his
Nobody has ever been
property is never extended ....
able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.2
As the defendant's taking departs further and further from the
literal, from the specific words, sounds, or pictures used by the plaintiff, the boundary between unprotected ideas and protected expression
becomes more and more uncertain.3 0 The patterning and arrangement
of the events in a work, taken apart from its words, cannot be seen
on the written page; they exist solely in the mind. They are abstractions from the work, mental images or descriptions rather than the
work itself.
An idea is a thought, a mental conception or image.1 When "expression" is an abstraction, it is of the same nature as an idea. The difference is one of degree, not of type. In this area, copyrights approach
"what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions
are, or at least may be, very subtile and refined, and, sometimes,
''
almost evanescent. 2
Although the idea/expression distinction provides a helpful way of
thinking about copyright, it does not provide a particularly precise or
useful tool. The necessarily subjective, ad hoc nature of this distinction s means that the classification ordinarily states the result reached
rather than a reason for reaching it. It reformulates rather than solves
the problem. One must therefore keep in mind the underlying reason

29. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
30. See B. KAPLAN, supra note 17, at 48 ("We are in a viscid quandary once we admit
that 'expression' can consist of anything not close aboard the particular collocation in its sequential
order.").
31.

WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

UNABRIDGED 901 (2d ed. 1983).

32. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
33. Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) ("[N]o
principle can be stated as to when an imitation has gone beyond copying the 'idea' and has
borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.").
:34. See Goodson-Todman Enters. v. Kellogg Co., 358 F. Supp. 1245, 1247 (quoting 2 M.
NIADIER, NIMOIER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 143.1, .11, at 619 (1972)). It is still necessary to decide
the extent of similarity that is substantial and thus infringing.
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for the distinction; that it provides a means of reconciling societal
interests. Copyright provides incentives for creation. Taken to its
extreme, however, it may unnecessarily impoverish the public domain,
bar subsequent authors from building on past creativity, and reduce
competition.
The scenes a faire doctrine has evolved from the same concerns.
All authors build on the work of their predecessors. "No man writes
exclusively from his own thoughts, unaided and uninstructed by the
thoughts of others."-* Some use of what has come before must be
permitted or creativity will be stifled. The idea/expression dichotomy
is helpful, but in some situations it may be necessary to permit subsequent authors to borrow more than ideas. When similarities naturally
or necessarily result from an idea common to both works, protection,
even of expression, may harm the very interests copyright seeks to
advance.
III.

THE NATURE OF SCENES A FAIRE

Judge Yankwich referred to scenes a faire as scenes which "must"
be done. 3 6 "[Wihen you are dealing with a common idea, no matter
how different the treatment may be, common elements will appear in
both products ....

[S]imilarities may appear which are inherent in

a situation. The French refer to them as scenes a faire, - that is,
scenes which must follow a certain situation."3 7
Earlier cases did not use the phrase "scenes a faire." They emphasized, however, that copyright did not protect stock situations,
plot elements and incidents that existed in the common stock before
the plaintiffs story was written.s They also noted that when the
35. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436); see infra note
91 and accompanying text.
36. Schwartz v. Universal Pictures Corp., 85 F. Supp. 270, 275 (C.D. Cal. 1945).
37. Yankwich, supra note 5, at 462 (emphasis in original).
38. See Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 100 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1938) (stress on marriage
when husband is unsuccessful financially and wife supports family); Harold Lloyd Corp. v.
Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933) (small-town boy seeks popularity in college); Dymow v. Bolton,
11 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926) (romantic relationship between ambitious young woman and ingenious
young man in financial straits who helps her); London v. Biograph Co., 231 F. 696 (2d Cir.
1916) (thieves commit a burglary, then poison each other); Bachman v. Belasco, 224 F. 817 (2d
Cir. 1915) (dual personality); Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 12 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Cal.
1935) (historical incident); Ornstein v. Paramount Prods., 9 F. Supp. 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) (husband contracts a disease and wife sacrifices her honor to pay for treatment); Simonton v. Gordon,
297 F. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (life in West Africa); Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1918)
(person financially unable to travel abroad pretends to leave and remains in nominally closed
house); Underhill v. Belasco, 254 F. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (child raised in convent); Stevenson
v. Harris, 238 F. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (wartime spy stories); Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404
(S.D.N.Y. 1913) (activities of a band of thieves).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol41/iss1/2
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plaintiffs and defendant's works were based on the same situation or
subject, the treatment and development of the plot would inevitably
contain similarities39 These similarities did not provide a sound basis
for a finding of infringement. Nor would scattered and incidental
similarities prove infringement unless they were combined and treated

40
in similar ways.

Although Judge Yankwich continued to use the phrase after 1942,41
other courts did not. They did, however, state that a finding of infringement could not be based on similarities in well-known plot situations, 42 or similarities that arose from common sources or subject
matter.4 3 Nor could such a finding be based on similarities that arose
inevitably from the situation, genre, or historical setting.-

39. Ornstein v. Paramount Prods., 9 F. Supp. 896, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); see Shipman v.
R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 100 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1938) (stress on marriage when husband is
financially unsuccessful and wife supports the family); Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d
1 (9th Cir. 1933) (small-town boy seeks popularity in college); Dezendorf v. Twentieth CenturyFox Film Corp., 32 F. Supp. 359 (S.D. Cal. 1940) (orphaned child protected by bachelor in
China); Rush v. Oursler, 39 F.2d 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (seeming murder of audience member
during stage performance); Simonton v. Gordon, 297 F. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (life in West Africa);
Underhill v. Belasco, 254 F. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (child raised in convent).
40. Dezendorf v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 32 F. Supp. 359 (S.D. Cal. 1940);
Ornstein v. Paramount Prods., 9 F. Supp. 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Simonton v. Gordon, 297 F.
625 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 171 N.E. 56 (1930); see Yankwich,
supra note 5, at 464-65 ("[S]imilarity of theme so obviously calls for similarity of treatment that
originality will be made to reside in the association and grouping of materials, the delineation
of character, the conflict and the other elements which are the very essence of a dramatic
production . .
").
41. Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 174 F. Supp. 733, 745 (S.D. Cal. 1959), rev'd,
287 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1961); Yankwich, supra note 5. In Supreme Records, Inc. v. Decca
Records, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 904, 911 (S.D. Cal. 1950), Judge Yankwich said that the similarities
between two arrangements of the same song were of a type that would occur to any arranger,
a kind of "musique a faire."
42. Funkhouser v. Loew's, Inc., 208 F.2d 185 (8th Cir. 1953) (many stories written about
the Harvey Girls and the Santa Fe Railroad), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 843 (1954); Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dieckhaus, 153 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1946) (several stock "gags" and
incidents); Burnett v. Lambino, 204 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (stock characters and situations
with school background).
43. Funkhouser v. Loew's, Inc., 208 F.2d 185 (8th Cir. 1953) (the Harvey Girls and the
early days of the railroad), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 843 (1954); Rosen v. Loew's, Inc., 162 F.2d
785 (2d Cir. 1947) (Nazi Germany); Burnett v. Lambino, 204 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)
(vocational school background); Warshawsky v. Carter, 132 F. Supp. 758 (D.D.C. 1955) (woman
becomes President of the United States).
44. Rosen v. Loew's, Inc., 162 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1947) (setting of Nazi Germany); Bevan
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 329 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (setting of Nazi prisoner of
war camps); Burnett v. Lambino, 204 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (vocational school setting);
Warshawsky v. Carter, 132 F. Supp. 758 (D.D.C. 1955) (woman becomes President of the
United States).
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More recent decisions have used the phrase scenes a faire, but no
single definition has emerged. Furthermore, while most definitions
refer to necessary, indispensable, or inevitable scenes, courts have
provided scant explanation of what makes a scene necessary.
A. Recent Definitions of Scenes a Faire
The phrase "scenes a faire" languished until 1976, when the Second
Circuit decided Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop. 41 In
Reyher, both the plaintiffs and defendant's stories involved a lost
child who identifies his/her mother as the most beautiful woman in
the world. The village leader gathers beautiful women from the surrounding area, but none is the child's mother. Finally a homely woman
appears, whom the child greets joyfully as the missing mother46 In
considering whether the defendant's work infringed the plaintiffs
copyright, the court sought to distill the unprotected idea from protected expression. It said that a helpful analytic concept was that of
scenes a faire, "sequences of events which necessarily follow from a
common theme. '[S]imilarity of expression ...

which necessarily re-

suits from the fact that the common idea is only capable of expression
in more or less stereotyped form will preclude a finding of actionable
similarity.' '

47

Both works presented the theme or idea that to a lost

child, the mother is beautiful, even though she may not be to the rest
of the world. The stories also contained similar events. 48 This did not
constitute infringement, however, as the similar scenes could be considered scenes a faire, "scenes which necessarily result from identical
situations. ' 49
After Reyher, the phrase "scenes a faire" exploded into use. Many
courts used a definition derived from Reyher,5° but other definitions
45.

533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).

46. Id. at 92.
47. Id. at 91 (quoting 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 26, § 13.03(A), at 13-33).
48. Id. at 92.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 91; see Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir.) ("scenes that
necessarily result from the choice of a setting or situation"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986);
Evans v. Wallace Berrie & Co., 681 F. Supp. 813, 817 (S.D. Fla. 1988) ("scenes which necessarily
must follow from certain similar plot situations"); Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 639 F.
Supp. 816, 819 (W.D. Mo. 1986) ("sequence of events which necessarily flow from a common
theme"), affd, 833 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1987); Wavelength Film Co. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
631 F. Supp. 305, 306 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("characters, settings, or events which necessarily follow
from a certain theme or plot situation"); Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1302 (S.D.N.Y.)
(quoting Reyher, 533 F.2d at 91), affd, 738 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984); Davis v. United Artists,
Inc., 547 F. Supp. 722, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("sequences of events which necessarily follow from
a common theme"); Giangrasso v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 534 F. Supp. 472, 477 n.3
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followed. For example, in Alexander v. Haley,51 the author of the
novel "Jubilee" claimed that the book "Roots" infringed her copyright.
Both books mingled fact and fiction, and involved the history of slavery
in the United States. The court found that all the similarities the
plaintiff claimed were in elements outside of copyright protection.
These elements included (1) facts; (2) materials traceable to common
sources, the public domain, or folk custom; (3) trite language and
metaphors; and (4) scenes a faire.5 2 The court defined the last as

"incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic."
Some of these scenes a faire were attempted escapes, flights through
the woods pursued by dogs, sex between a slave owner and his female
slave, and the sale of a slave child away from her family. 4
The various definitions of scenes a faire- include two different, yet
overlapping, concepts. The Alexander definition makes "stock" or
"standard" sound like a more relaxed form of "indispensable." However, a stock scene may be different from a necessary or indispensable
one. A stock scene is one that is often used. Such a scene may be

(E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("similarity in dramatic sequence . . . only capable of expression in more or
less stereotyped form"); Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774, 777 (C.D. Cal. 1981) ("sequences
which necessarily follow from a common theme"), affd, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982); Gibson v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 491 F. Supp. 583, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (quoting Reyher, 533 F.2d
at 91); Midwood v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 1981 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 25,292.(S.D.N.Y.
1981) ("scenes which necessarily result from identical situations").
51. 460 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
52. Id. at 44-46.
53. Id. at 45. For other cases using a definition of scenes a faire derived from Alexander
v. Haley, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
54. Id. at 45 & 45 n.7.
55. Scenes a faire have been defined as "forms of expression that were either stock scenes
or scenes that flowed necessarily from common unprotectable ideas." See v. Durang, 711 F.2d
141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983); see Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d
4&5 (9th Cir.) (quoting See, 711 F.2d at 141), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984); Overman v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 350, 353 (C.D. Cal. 1984) ("forms of expression which
. ..flow necessarily from the elements common to the two works"), affd, 767 F.2d 933 (9th
Cir. 1985). They also have been defined as situations, scenes or incidents which flow naturally
from a theme or plot premise. See Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir.) ("situations
and incidents which flow naturally from a basic plot premise"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985);
Evans v. Wallace Berrie & Co., 681 F. Supp. 813, 817 (S.D. Fla. 1988) ("events which follow
naturally from a common theme"); Anderson v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1, 2
(C.D. Cal. 1985) ("incidents, characters or settings that naturally flow from or are standard to
the treatment of certain ideas and themes"); Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries,
Ltd., 452 F. Supp. 429, 439 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) ("expressions which naturally flow from the
attempt to convey a common ...

theme").
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characterized as "common" in two senses. It is ordinary as well as
common to plaintiff's and defendant's works. Another author may or
may not "need" to use it. But when a scene follows "necessarily" from
a common theme, topic, or idea, "common" means common to the two
works; the scene may or may not be stock.
B.

The Meaning of "Necessary"

It is much more difficult to grasp the meaning of a necessary scene
than of a stock one. Even Judge Yankwich had some problems with
the concept. In Schwartz v. UniversalPictures,m he sought to describe
what he meant by a scene a faire, a scene which must be done.
For instance, the "scene a faire" in the present script is
called for by the scene in which the girl burned her hand
on a cigarette. Something had to be done with that burn,
and the author uses it as a means of identification. In an old
play in which Adolphe Menjou appeared . . . he came in,
spilled some red ink; then took a handkerchief and wiped
the ink off his hand with it. That was the beginning. Ultimately there had to be a scene explaining the red spot..
• . So in all dramatic works we find that situations which
are identical call for scenes which are similar.r 7
Once an author chooses a situation, "it calls for certain sequences in
the method of treatment, which cannot be avoided, because they are,
in the very nature of the development of the theme, and are used by
every writer that knows his craft."' s
It is unclear, however, what an author must necessarily or unavoidably do with the girl with the burned hand or the man with the
ink-stained handkerchief. The only thing that seems truly necessary
is that something be done with them.5 9 The audience is likely to be
dissatisfied if the author fails to put these situations and characters

56. 85 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
57. Id. at 275. In an earlier case, Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013, 1017
(S.D. Cal. 1942), Judge Yankwich made the same point when he said that certain incidents will
arise inevitably from a situation. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text; Note, Copyright
Infringement:An Argument for the Elimination of the Scenes a FaireDoctrine, 5 CoMlM. ENT.
L.J. 147, 158 (1982).
58. Schwartz, 85 F. Supp. at 276.
59. In his later article, Judge Yankwich appeared to recognize this, saying that "[s]irnilarities
may appear which are inherent in a situation." Once the scene involving spilled red ink was
introduced, "quite evidently for a purpose, other scenes had to be resorted to to explain the
spot." Yankwich, supra note 5, at 462-63 (emphasis in original).
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to some use. But if a play uses a burn as a means of identification or
includes a man getting red ink on his handkerchief, many ensuing
events are possible. No particular scene is necessary or unavoidable.
Courts have provided little assistance in confronting the nature of
necessity in scenes a faire cases. They ordinarily define scenes a faire
using one of the definitions given above, then describe a series of
events that are scenes a faire and therefore unprotectible. Meanwhile,
the meaning of "necessary" remains unclear.
1. Indispensable Scenes
The most obvious meaning of "necessary" is indispensable or essential, as water is necessary to lifeA° Few scenes will satisfy that requirement. Although scenes a faire are not necessary to sustain life, some
courts seem to believe they are necessary to sustain creative life.
These courts say that scenes a faire are forms of expression needed
to express an idea, and must be left unprotected by copyright lest
the idea itself be monopolilzed.61 "Scenes a faire are afforded no
protection because the subject matter represented can be expressed
in no other way than through the particular scene a faire. Therefore,
granting a copyright 'would give the first author a monopoly on the
commonplace ideas behind the scenes a faire.' ' 62 The scene a faire is
considered necessary because the author cannot express a particular
idea without it.
Plainly, some ideas admit of a greater variety of expression than
others. Rarely, however, is an idea incapable of some alternative
means of expression, particularly in fiction,6 the setting in which most

60.

WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 1200 (2d ed.

1983).
61. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736
F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 103 (1984); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips
Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616-17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Evans
v. Wallace Berrie & Co., 681 F. Supp. 813, 817 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (quoting Landsberg, 736 F.2d
at 489); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 229 (D. Md. 1981).
62. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986)
(quoting Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
63. See Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984) ("Some ideas can be expressed in myriad ways, while others
allow only a narrow range of expression. Fictional works generally fall into the first category.");
see also Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236-38 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied,479 U.S. 1031 (1987). Most of the scenes a faire cases which discuss monopoliz-

ing an idea are concerned not with plots of fictional books, plays, and films, but with video
games and practically-oriented works. These cases discuss not only the scenes a faire doctrine,
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scenes a faire cases arise. If more than one means of expression exists,
forbidding other authors to copy one particular way of expressing the
idea will not create an effective monopoly on that idea.
If scenes a faire consisted solely of scenes truly indispensable to
the expression of an idea, the scenes a faire doctrine would encompass
virtually nothing. However, the doctrine has not been so limited.
Although courts often use the language of indispensability, an analysis
of the cases shows that the doctrine in fact encompasses an alternate
definition of "necessary": "inherent in the situation."64
2. Scenes Inherent in the Situation
In some cases, necessity seems to arise from the standard or common nature of a scene. "Because it is virtually impossible to write
about a particular historical era or fictional theme without employing
certain 'stock' or standard literary' devices, we have held that scenes
a faire are not copyrightable as a matter of law." Certain scenes
appear almost inevitably in every genre. Stories about spies,6 police,6
but also the merger of expression and idea, the underlying principal of which is that expression
merges into idea when the idea behind the expression can be expressed in only one or a very
limited number of ways. See Educational Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 539 (3d Cir.
1986).
64. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 1200 (2d ed.
1983).
65. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 841 (1980). Conversely, the more unusual or arbitrary a scene is, the less likely it is to
flow from the logic or necessity of an idea and the more likely courts are to find it protectible.
See Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 287 F.2d 478, 485 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 368
U.S. 801 (1961); Barris/Fraser Enters. v. Goodson-Todman Enters., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1887,
1891 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
66. Stevenson v. Harris, 238 F. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
Having acquired a spy, the novel and the play require that the spy must get
somebody into trouble. Lost or stolen passports have long been a source of much
difficulty and embarrassment. Then, of course, there must be a love affair, which,
The hero must not be named John or James.
preferably, should end happily ....
He must have the kind of name which annoys him through life while, fortunately,
the heroine must have a simple name of biblical or historic origin. If possible, there
must be an inn, for that makes a good setting, and even war figures must eat and,
besides, there must be waiters or waitresses who hear or impart state and military
secrets, as it is quite customary to discuss such matters in a loud voice in restaurants
and inns.
Id. at 433-34.
67. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 430, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 784
F.2d 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986) (In any account of police work in the
embattled part of the Bronx known as Fort Apache, "based on experiences in a poverty stricken,
crime-ridden environment, depictions of bribery, prostitution, purse-snatching and neighborhood
hostility to law enforcers are inevitable." Disarming threatening persons and the poor morale
of unhappy officers are stock material for most police stories.).
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female foundlings raised in convents,r s and slavery69 all have stock

elements. Addressing two works about Nazi Germany, one court said
that similar details, such as burning Jewish books and students rioting
against their Jewish teachers were "nearly inevitable." 70 Another court
found that similarities between two works about prisoner of war camps
in Hitler's Germany were "virtually necessitated by the use of the
same historical setting. 71 These similarities are not necessary in the

sense that they are indispensable. Other scenes might have been substituted, but these scenes would be similar to those appearing in yet
other works. They are, however, inherent in the situation.
Consider, for example, Wavelength Film Co. v. Columbia Pictures
Industries. 72 Two films, plaintiffs "Wavelength" and defendant's "Starman," shared the theme of a stranded alien trying to return home,
being pursued by hostile government authorities, and finally being
rescued by friendly humans. The court found that the following
similarities between the films were scenes a faire, indispensable to
the treatment of that kind of science fiction theme:
[A]n alien arrives on earth in a spaceship; all humans are
afraid of the unknown alien; governmental authorities are
trying to capture or destroy the alien; one human becomes
friendly with the alien and tries to help it return home safely;
and the alien leaves earth on a spaceship immediately before
death. 7
These elements certainly seem standard. 74 But they are not indispensable, as the theme could be expressed in other ways. For instance,
the alien might arrive on a space beam. Most humans could admire
and trust the alien, who is being pursued by a vicious government.
The friendly humans could seek to keep the alien with them for their
own purposes. Some concern other than impending death could create
an urgent need for the alien's return home; perhaps the alien carries
a needed serum against a plague threatening the home world.

68. Underhill v. Belasco, 254 F. 838, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (The basic theme was old. "Given
life in a convent, there must be in any two productions a certain amount of similar conversation

and a certain amount of similar acts.").
69. Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
70. Rosen v. Loew's, Inc., 162 F.2d 785, 788 (2d Cir. 1947).
71. Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 329 F. Supp. 601, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
72. 631 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
73. Id. at 307.
74. Indeed, there is a wonderful old science-fiction film called The Day the Earth Stood
Still (20th Century-Fox 1951) starring Michael Rennie that contained all these elements.
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Although the similarities listed in Wavelength are not in fact indispensable, they are all inherent in the situation. New authors should
not be deprived of a whole series of plot elements that naturally arise
from the basic theme. An author attempting to write without using
these elements would be forced into unnatural contortions in an attempt to design around them.
Similarly, the use of talking, anthropomorphized eggs does not
inevitably require that the eggs discuss such matters as lying under
a chicken, being placed in a cardboard box, and their reactions to the
possibility of being scrambled or fried. 75 In Gibson v. Columbia Broadcasting System,76 the plaintiff argued that these similarities between
his lecture and the defendant's television skit did not necessarily follow, as many events occur in the life of an egg. The egg might have
been hatched in an incubator, colored, rolled, boiled, whipped, used
in a souffle, or used raw. The court said, however, that the occurrences
common to both works were "fairly predictable and usual in the life
of an egg, while the alternatives . . . do not 'necessarily flow' from

the 'common theme.'"' This seems incorrect, as the alternatives do
seem to flow just as naturally or necessarily from the common theme
of a talking egg with human characteristics. However, the plaintiffs
uses of the theme were inherent in the situation. Those who subsequently wish to use the same theme should not be deprived of entire
areas of egg behavior.
Video games provide another example. In Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc.,78 the defendants based their video game on plaintiffs. Both involved spaceships combatting rocks and other spaceships,
and had many common characteristics as well as differences. The court
concluded that the many, detailed similarities in expression between
the two games were dictated by the requirements of any version of
the basic idea of a video game involving space rocks. 79 Despite the
court's conclusion, these similarities were not inevitable. For example,
both games had three sizes of rocks, which appeared in waves. The
large rock, when hit, split into two medium rocks, a medium rock into
two small ones, and a small rock disappeared. 0 Presumably, rocks
could have come in four sizes not three, and could have broken into

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See Gibson v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 491 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Id.
Id. at 586.
547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981).
Id. at 229.
Id. at 224.
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three parts rather than two. Nonetheless, the first comer should not
acquire a monopoly on what might well be the most convenient configuration of rocks.
Inevitability is too narrow a concept for defining scenes a faire.
In Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Industries,81 the plaintiff claimed
that the defendant's poster infringed on his New Yorker cover illustration of the world as viewed from Manhattan. The court rejected the
defendant's argument that the similarities were in scenes a faire. 2 It
noted that a striking stylistic relationship existed between the illustrations. Furthermore, both artists
chose a vantage point that looks directly down a wide twoway cross street that intersects two avenues before reaching
a river. Despite defendants' protestations, this is not an
inevitable way of depicting blocks in a city with a grid-like
street system, particularly since most New York City cross
streets are one way.1'
The Steinberg court was probably correct in concluding that the
defendant's poster infringed the plaintiffs copyright, as the basic look
of the poster, with very idiosyncratic stylistic elements, was taken.
However, the court also seemed willing to protect the plaintiff's choice
of vantage point and method of depicting city blocks. Although this
choice obviously was not inevitable, others should not be forbidden
from making a like choice. No one artist should be given the exclusive
rights to so basic a vantage point. A too literal reading of "indispensable" can lead to overprotection, because any scene to which alternatives exist would not qualify as a scene a faire.
"Necessary" in the context of scenes a faire does not mean that
there is no other way to do it. It may mean that there is no other
equally satisfactory way to do it. A scene may be obligatory in Sarcey's
sense, one which the audience expects and desires, without which the
logic of the action is harmed and the audience left dissatisfied. An
author should not be required to design around the most effective
means of expression.
But scenes a faire have an even broader scope. Properly defined,
they include scenes that flow naturally from the logic of a solution.4

81.
82.
83.
84.

663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Id. at 713.
Id. at 712.
Some courts have defined scenes a faire without using the words necessary or inevitable,
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The human mind can imagine a wide spectrum of possibilities arising
out of a given situation, theme, or setting. Given human experience,
however, a limited number of results seem particularly logical or inherent in a situation.s Such scenes fall within the category of "necessary"
scenes because they are akin to ideas or elements of vocabulary needed
to construct a work.86
IV.

WHY SCENES A FAIRE ARE UNPROTECTIBLE

Having considered the meaning of scenes a faire, it is important
to determine why they should be considered unprotected by copyright.
Scenes a faire might be unprotectible for three reasons. First, they
may not be original with the author. Second, any similarity between
plaintiffs and defendant's works may not by itself be good evidence
of copying. And third, even copying of some material that is original
with the plaintiff should be permitted.
A.

Originality

Copyright only protects original works of authorship. 7 The standard for originality is low, however. A work need not be novel, highly

creative, or aesthetically appealing. Originality merely requires that
the work owe its origin to the author - that it be independently
created and not copied from other works.s It means little more than
a prohibition against actual copying.8

saying that they are situations, scenes, or incidents that flow naturally from a theme or plot
premise. See Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir.) ("situations and incidents which
flow naturally from a basic plot premise"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985); Evans v. Wallace
Berrie & Co., 681 F. Supp. 813, 817 (S.D. Fla. 1988) ("events which follow naturally from a
common theme"); Anderson v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1, 2 (C.D. Cal. 1985)
("incidents, characters or settings that naturally flow from or are standard to the treatment of
certain ideas and themes"); Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries, Ltd., 452 F.
Supp. 429, 439 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) ("expressions which naturally flow from the attempt to convey
a common ...

theme").

85. Of course, a scene may seem far more logical or inherent after we have read or viewed
the plaintiffs work than before. This, however, is a problem requiring careful analysis rather
than exclusion.
86. Similarities in scenes that arise from the logic of a situation may be poor evidence of
copying. See infra notes 107-21 and accompanying text. Such scenes also should be deemed
unprotectible because otherwise the options open to new authors will be progressively narrowed.
See infra notes 14748 and accompanying text.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
88. 1 M. NIMIER, supra note 26, § 2.01(A).
89. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951) (quoting
Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Myer Co., 31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929)).
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If two works are based on a common source, many of the events
in each are likely to be unoriginal. The same is true of stock events.
Indeed, dramatic situations are few. Few scenes, events, or situations
are truly unique in the abstract. The number of themes available for
use, which all authors must share, is limited. One writer has asserted
that no more than thirty-six fundamental dramatic situations exist.The number is arbitrary, but the principle is correct. As Judge Story
said:
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and
can be, few, if any things, which, in an abstract sense, are
strictly new and original throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow,
and use much which was well known and used before. 91
Thus, an author cannot claim protection for the abstract expression
of his work "if the work on such abstract level is not the product of
' 92
his original authorship.

In many early cases, courts refused to protect stock situations
because they considered them common property that existed long
before the plaintiffs story was written.93 They often seemed to assume
90. "'Gozzi maintained that there can be but thirty-six tragic situations. Schiller took great
pains to find more, but he was unable to find even so many as Gozzi.' - Goethe." G. POLTI,
THE THIRTY-SIX DRAMATIC SITUATIONS 7 (1954 reprint); see Schwartz v. Universal Pictures
Co., 85 F. Supp. 270, 275 (S.D. Cal. 1945) (the world's dramatic literature can be reduced to
three dozen situations); Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 632, 634 (S.D.
Cal. 1935) (same); Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 741, 299 P.2d 257, 271 (1956) (same).
91. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436); See Berkic v.
Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985) (there is nothing
original or new under the sun); Bachman v. Belasco, 224 F. 817 (2d Cir. 1915) (there is rarely
anything that is physically new, that does not contain something from a previous publication);
Simonton v. Gordon, 297 F. 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (works inevitably contain something found
in previous publications).
92. 3 M. NIMIER, &upranote 26, § 13.03(A)(1).
93. See Funkhouser v. Loew's, Inc., 208 F.2d 185 (8th Cir. 1953) (many stories written
about the Harvey Girls and the Santa Fe Railroad), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 843 (1954); Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dieckhaus, 153 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1946) (several stock "gags" and
incidents); Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 100 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1938) (stress on marriage
when husband is unsuccessful financially and wife becomes the "bread winner"); Harold Lloyd
Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933) (small-town boy seeks popularity in college); London
v. Biograph Co., 231 F. 696 (2d Cir. 1916) (thieves commit a burglary, then poison each other);
Burnett v. Lambino, 204 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (stock characters and situations inherent
in school setting); Ornstein v. Paramount Prods., 9 F. Supp. 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) (husband
contracts a disease and wife sacrifices her honor to pay for treatment); Simonton v. Gordon,
297 F. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (life in West Africa); Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1918)
(person financially unable to travel abroad pretends to leave, but remains in nominally closed
house); Underhill v. Belasco, 254 F. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (child raised in a convent).
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that these old and much used plot elements lacked originality. Originality could be found in the association and grouping of incidents in
a new way, but not in the incidents themselves.9
For example, in London v. Biograph Co., 9 the plots of both the
plaintiffs story and defendant's motion picture involved two thieves
who commit a burglary, return to their room, and quarrel over the
booty. Each manages to put poison in something the other is about
to swallow, and both thieves die.9 The court said that the plaintiffs
copyright could not protect the old, common plot that had appeared
in Chaucer's "Pardoner's Tale" and in still earlier versions. 97 Although
the copyright might protect the author's embellishments of an old plot,
it would not "operate to prohibit the presentation by someone else of
the same old plot without the particular embellishments."' 98 Similarly,
in Walker v. Time Life Films,99 the court said that foot chases, the
morale problems of policemen, and the familiar figure of the Irish cop
are "venerable and often-recurring themes of police fiction. As such,
they are not copyrightable except to the extent they are given unique
-

and therefore protectible -

expression in an original creation."1

°

To a certain extent, therefore, the requirement of originality explains the scenes a faire doctrine. But it does not provide a full explanation. Even stock scenes may occasionally be original. An author
might create a scene that is in fact stock without ever having heard
of it, making it, in copyright terms, an original creation. "A work is
original and may command copyright protection even if it is completely
identical with a prior work provided it was not copied from such prior
work but is rather a product of the independent efforts of its author." 10 1
Indeed, Professor Nimmer has objected to the references to "stock"
or "standard" in definitions of scenes a faire because they imply that
"copyright is not available for the hackneyed even if original with the

94. Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933); Simonton v. Gordon, 297 F.
625 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Stevenson v. Harris, 238 F. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); see Schwartz v. Universal
Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 1945); Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12
F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Cal. 1935); see also Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d
87, 92 n.4 (2d Cir.) (originality found in association and grouping of materials and other elements
which are the essence of dramatic production), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
95. 231 F. 696 (2d Cir. 1916).
96. Id. at 697.
97. Id. at 698-99.
98. Id. at 699.
99. 784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986).
100. Id. at 50; see Stevenson v. Harris, 238 F. 432, 433-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
101. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 26, § 2.01(A)(1).
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copyright claimant."11 This echoes Judge Hand's comments in Sheldon
v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.10 3 In discussing cases that seemingly
held that an old plot could not be copyrighted,104 he said that "anticipation as such cannot invalidate a copyright."1 0 5 An author does not
have to be first to be original.
Perhaps seeking evidence of originality in cases where the
similarities between the plaintiffs and defendant's works are in stock
scenes wastes judicial resources. As the abstraction of an old and
hackneyed scene is unlikely to be original, and the value to be derived
from protecting it is, in any event, low, it may be preferable to conclude that such a scene is not protectible. As Professor Kaplan said,
"to make the copyright turnstile revolve, the author should have to
deposit more than a penny in the box, and some like measure ought
to apply to infringement."1 However, the scenes a faire doctrine
extends beyond the question of whether the plaintiffs scene is original.
B.

Evidence of Copying

Copyright does not protect against independent creation, but only
against copying. If there is no copying, there is no infringement. Thus,
no infringement exists if a subsequent work, although substantially
similar to a prior work, has been independently created without ref-

erence to its predecessor. 107 This is true despite "that obsessive conviction, so frequent among authors and composers, that all similarities

between their works and any others which appear later must inevitably
'
Thus, the mere existence of similarity,
be ascribed to plagiarism."10s

102. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 26, § 13.03(A), 13-33 n.43.
103. 81 F.2d 49, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1936).
104. He referred to London v. Biograph Co., 231 F. 696 (2d Cir. 1916) and Eichel v. Marcin,
241 F. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 54.
105. Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 54. He added that a plagiarist is not an author, but "if by some
magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keat's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he
would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they
might of course copy Keats's." Id.
106. B. KAPLAN, supra note 17, at 46.
107. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 26, § 8.01(A); see Harold Lloyd Corp. v. witwer, 65 F.2d
1, 16-17 (9th Cir. 1933); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924);
Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 624 (D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
108. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 150 F.2d 612, 613 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 327 U.S.
790 (1945). In Lewys v. O'Neill, 49 F.2d 603, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1931), the court stated that
[o]n Tuesday, October 2, 1753, in the Adventurer, No. 95, Dr. Johnson wrote an
essay on plagiarism ...[writing] "The allegation of resemblance between authors,
is indisputably true; but the charge of plagiarism, which is raised upon it, is not
to be allowed with equal readiness. A coincidence of sentiment may easily happen
without any communication, since there are many occasions in which all reasonable
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or even identity, between two works does not mean that one infringes
the other. Such similarity is only evidence of copying. The strength
of this evidence depends on the surrounding circumstances, on the
likelihood that similarity exists in the absence of copying. 109
Substantial similarity between two works often cannot be readily
explained by anything other than copying. The similarity may be so
great as to make coincidence unlikely. In cases involving scenes a
faire, however, other explanations do exist.ll

°

When two works use

the same stock scenes, or are based on the same source, they are
likely to be substantially similar even in the absence of copying.
A common source may suggest plot elements and dialogue to more
than one author, each of whom works independently. For example,
in Bachman v. Belasco,11 the plaintiff and defendant both wrote plays
about a young woman with a dual personality. Both authors traced
the idea to nonfictional accounts of such a woman. The court said that
all significant similarities could readily be accounted for by the common
source, which naturally suggested certain situations. This included the
situation central to each play, "that an attractive young lady with a
dual personality, one serious and conventional, the other frisky and
highly unconventional, may find herself placed in situations calculated
to injure her reputation.' 1

2

Conversely, the more unusual or arbitrary

a scene, the less likely it is that similarities between two works are
coincidental. "3
men will nearly think alike. Writers of all ages have had the same sentiments,
because they have in all ages had the same objects of speculation; the interests
and passions, the virtues and vices of mankind, have been diversified in different
times, only by unessential and casual varieties; and we must, therefore, expect in
the words of all those who attempt to describe them, such a likeness as we find
in the pictures of the same person drawn in different periods of his life."
109. Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 16-17 (9th Cir. 1933).
110. See infra notes 111-21; see also Funkhouser v. Loew's Inc., 208 F.2d 185, 188 (8th
Cir. 1953) (similar incidents in plaintiffs stories and defendant's film due to nature of the subject
matter and background, not to copying), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 843 (1954); Harold Lloyd, 65
F.2d at 617 (similarity is not infringing if it results from the fact that both works deal with the
same subject or make use of common sources); Burnett v. Lambino, 204 F. Supp. 327, 331
(S.D.N.Y. 1962) (similarities inherent in the vocational schools' background not infringing).
111. 224 F. 817 (2d Cir. 1915).
112. Id. at 818. When two works involved POW camps within Hitler's Germany, similarities
in stock items, characteristic of the POW camp genre of literature, did not demonstrate copying.
Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 329 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see also Echevarria
v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 632, 637-38 (S.D. Cal. 1935) (similarities not
infringing when they arise from the use of the same two historical characters in the same
historical setting).
113. See Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 287 F.2d 478 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
380 U.S. 801 (1961).
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The same problem arises from the portrayal of events that "necessarily" or naturally follow from a common theme, subject, situation, or
idea. If these events are similar in two works, copying is not the only
explanation. Results that are particularly logical or inherent in a situation can easily occur to different authors who have never heard of
one another and never seen each other's work. In Warshawsky v.
Carter,'" for example, both the plaintiffs and defendant's stories concerned a woman who became President of the United States. The
court found many substantial similarities between the works, but concluded that these similarities would normally occur in two stories
about a woman who became President. 115 For instance, the protagonist
in both stories was elected Vice President then succeeded to the presidency after the President's death. 116 Writing in 1955, the Warshawsky
court said it "would be naive indeed to assume that [a woman] could
be nominated and elected as [President] instead of succeeding as an
elected Vice President. ' '" 7 The court recognized that similarity can
result from copying, but may also occur because of the subject matter
and setting common to both stories.11 In a more recent case," 9
both plaintiffs and defendant's stories involved an underwater world
where inhabitants used sand dollars as currency, food made of seaweed, seahorses for transportation, and plates made of mother of
pearl.Y2 These similarities were not explainable only by copying; they
2
were probably due to the common idea of an underwater setting.' '
In cases involving scenes a faire, similarity is likely even in the
absence of copying. Independent creation is a plausible explanation
for similarity when two authors use similar stock scenes or scenes
that are likely given the nature of the subject matter or theme. But

114.

132 F. Supp. 758 (D.D.C. 1955).

115.
116.

Id. at 760.
Id. at 759.

117.

Id. at 760. With respect to the similarity in the protagonist's political roles, the court

said it was "unrealistic to assume that any woman could aspire to be, much less succeed in
being, nominated as a vice presidential candidate without some substantial support and backing

for an advocated program that had some appeal among a substantial number of voters." Id.
118. Id.
119. Evans v. Wallace Berrie & Co., 681 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
120. Id. at 817.
121. Id. at 818 n.6 (discussing striking similarity between the works); see Rush v. Oursler,
39 F.2d 468, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (The parties' plays both had a stage performance interrupted
by a murder of a person seated in the audience, who pretends to be a real audience-member.

The court said: "When two authors portray the same occurrence, in the same setting, presupposing the presence of the same people in the same environment, acting under the same emotions,
similarities of incident, unaccompanied by similarities in plot, are not persuasive evidence of
copying ....
[S]uch similarities are inevitable.").

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

this likelihood alone insufficiently explains the scenes a faire doctrine,
as the doctrine contemplates a lack of liability under some circumstances even if copying exists.12
C.

Permissible Copying

Copyright does not forbid all copying. In an infringement case, the

plaintiff must show improper appropriation as well as copying. ' Plaintiffs can usually establish both these elements in the same way - by
showing substantial similarity between the defendant's work and their
own. But copying and improper appropriation are not the same thing. '

For example, an artist can sit for hours before a copyrighted painting

"copying" it, but if its appearance is entirely different, the artist has
not infringed.
Ideas may be freely copied and used. 12 They are unprotected even
against direct copying. 2 6 In a case involving several fictional versions
of the same murder and trial,m Judge Learned Hand said that the

122. Bee kicv. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985).
128. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc.,
784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips
Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Davis v.
United Artists, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc.,
547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981); Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 329 F. Supp. 601
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
124. Some cases say a plaintiff may show that expression was improperly appropriated by
proving that substantial similarities exist as to protectible material. See Walker v. Time Life
Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986); Atari, Inc. v. North
Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880
(1982); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 841 (1980); Barris/Fraser Enters. v. Goodson-Todman Enters., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1887
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
125. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text; see also Lewys v. O'Neill, 49 F.2d 603,
607 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (quoting A. BIRRELL, Literary Larceny, in SEVEN LECTURES ON THE
LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 167 ("Ideas ...
are [as] free as air. If you
happen to have any, you fling them into the common stock, and ought to be well content to
see your poorer brethren thriving upon them."); Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 411 (S.D.N.Y.
1913) (quoting Chatterton v. Cave, 3 App. Cas. 483, 501 (1878)).
An idea may be taken from a drama and used in forming another, without the
representation of the second being a representation of any part of the first. For
example, I have no doubt that Sheridan, in composing 'The Critic,' took the idea
from 'The Rehearsal'; but I think it would be an abuse of language to say that
those who represent The Critic' represent 'The Rehearsal' or any part thereof;
and if it were left to me to find the fact, I should, without hesitation, find that
they did not.
126. Frybarger v. International Business Machs., 812 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1987).
127. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
669 (1936).
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defendants could use not only material the plaintiffs did not originate,
but "even the plaintiffs' contribution itself, if they drew from it only
the more general patterns; that is, if they kept clear of its 'expression."' Similarly, in Nichols v. UniversalPictures Corp.,'9 both the
plaintiffs play and the defendant's motion picture concerned a quarrel
between a Jewish and Irish father, the marriage of their children, the
birth of grandchildren, and a reconciliation. 130 Judge Hand said that
even if the plaintiffs play was wholly original, which he doubted, and
the defendant took those elements from the plaintiff, there was no
infringement. "Though the plaintiff discovered the vein, she could not
keep it to herself; so defined, the theme was too generalized an abstraction from what she wrote. It was only a part of her 'ideas. ' ' 131 An
author may directly copy ideas, themes, or facts from another author
without infringement.
If that which is denominated a scene a faire is considered an idea,
it is therefore unprotectible. In Rush v. Oursler,132 the plaintiffs and
defendant's plays included the interruption of a stage performance by
the murder of a person seated in the audience. Both plays created
the illusion that the murder was real, and that the murder victims
were members of the audience rather than the cast. The Rush court
133
said that this was a dramatic incident which is not copyrightable.
An author could not "by obtaining a copyright withdraw from others
34
the right to portray such an occurrence in literary or dramatic form."'
13
5
In a later but similar case, the court said that even if the defendant
copied the idea of a remote broadcast interrupted by an armed robber,
the copying was not actionable "because it is only of an idea, and the
handling, scenes, details and characterization used by plaintiffs and
defendants in their works based on this idea are unquestionably not
' 136
substantially similar.'

128. Id. at 54.
129. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
130. Id. at 122.
131. Id.; see Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926) (If there was copying - which
the court did not believe - it was permissible because the mere subsection of plot that was
similar was not susceptible of copyright.).
132. 39 F.2d 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
133. Id. at 472-73.
134. Id.; see Ornstein v. Paramount Prods., 9 F. Supp. 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) (although
defendants probably had taken some ideas from plaintiffs play, there was no infringement).
135. Giangrasso v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 534 F. Supp. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
136. Id. at 476.
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This does not preclude liability for copying a plot, at least if "plot"
is broadly defined. 137 A defendant who takes a sufficiently detailed
and concrete pattern from the plaintiffs work may have appropriated
the plaintiffs expression.138 Of course, the line between idea and expression frequently is difficult to draw. 39 The essence of infringement,
however, lies not in taking a general theme, but rather "its particular
expression through similarities of treatment, details, scenes, events
and characterization.'

140

But the scenes a faire doctrine extends beyond the idea/expression
dichotomy. 141 A number of cases say that both ideas and scenes a faire
are unprotected.'4 Some state that scenes a faire include forms of
137. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). Judge Hand
said that Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926), did not hold that a plagiarist was never
liable for stealing a plot, although in that case the most detailed pattern common to both was
not very detailed, and there was no infringement. He added, "but we do not doubt that two
plays may correspond in plot closely enough for infringement. How far that correspondence
must go is another matter." Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121; see also 3 M. NIAMMER, su/pra note 26, §
13.03(A) (cases denying protection to a plot ordinarily have defined it "as ... the equivalent
of an abstract idea").
138. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
139. See Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 980 (1976); see also supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text.
140. Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 980 (1976); Davis v. United Artists, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 722, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Giangrasso
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 534 F. Supp. 472, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); see Warner Bros., Inc.
v. American Broadcasting Cos., 654 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting National Comics
Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir. 1951) ("[No one
infringes, unless he descends so far into what is concrete [in a work] as to invade . . . [its]
expression."); Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) ("It is doubtful whether
incidents per se can become copyrightable literary property, but it does not take many of them,
nor much causal connection thereof, to make what will pass for a plot, or scene, and constitute
the action of a play; and that a scene has literary quality and can be copyrighted, and piracy
may consist in appropriating the action of a play without any of the words is well settled.").
141. Or at least it may, given the difficulty of distinguishing between an idea and the
abstract expression of that idea.
142. Frybarger v. International Business Machs., 812 F.2d 525, 529-30 (9th Cir. 1987);
Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293-94 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985); See v.
Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs.
Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 615 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Wavelength Film Co. v.
Columbia Pictures, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Zambito v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 613 F. Supp. 1107, 1112 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 788 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1985); Overman v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 350, 353 (C.D. Cal. 1984), affd, 767 F.2d 933 (9th
Cir. 1985); Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774, 777 (C.D. Cal. 1981), affd, 698 F.2d 966 (9th
Cir. 1982); Gibson v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 491 F. Supp. 583, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Miller
Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries, Ltd., 452 F. Supp. 429, 439 (W.D.N.Y. 1978);
Barris/Fraser Enters. v. Goodson-Todman Enters., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1887, 1893 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
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expression that either necessarily flow from a common idea or are
essential to an idea. 43 "[Clertain forms of literary expression are not
protected against copying .... [Tihe general idea for a story is among
these. So too are all situations and incidents which flow naturally from
a basic plot premise, so-called scenes a faire.1I" In more general terms,
some courts require not only that a plaintiff show copying by proving
access and substantial similarity, but also that the defendant improperly appropriated the plaintiffs expression. To prove the latter, the
plaintiff must show that the similarities relate to protectible material. 145
Thus, even an admitted copier of original expression may not be
an infringer. This may enhance judicial economy. If the only
similarities between plaintiffs and defendant's works are in scenes a
faire, it is unnecessary to decide if the plaintiffs work is original or
if it has been copied.14 3 More important, when scenes a faire are involved, ostensibly substantial similarities in expression should not always be actionable, even if the defendant has copied from the plaintiff.
When the similarities between two works exist in stock or "necessary" scenes, the scenes are likely to look and feel the same. They
may be similarly patterned at a high level of specificity. Substantial
similarity, as ordinarily understood, does not suffice as a means of
finding copying or improper appropriation. A trier of fact may find
copying where it does not exist. Even when some copying is present,
it should not be actionable merely because the works look and feel
the same. Although copyright must provide incentives to create, it
must also protect the public domain and avoid hindering new creations.
"[T]he purpose of the copyright law is to create the most efficient and
productive balance between protection (incentive) and dissemination
of information, to promote learning, culture and development.' 11 7 Too
143. See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World,
Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 228 (D. Md. 1981); Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries,
Ltd., 452 F. Supp. 429, 439 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); see Frybarger v. International Business Machs.,
812 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1985).
144. Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985);
see See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983) (The trial court inaccurately characterized
the scenes a faire doctrine as relating to unprotected ideas, but properly applied it to "hold
unprotectable forms of expression that were either stock scenes or scenes that flowed necessarily
from common unprotectable ideas.").
145. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1159 (1986); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 841 (1980); Davis v. United Artists, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 722, 723-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
BarrislFraser Enters. v. Goodson-Todman Enters., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1887 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
146. Given the inclination of attorneys to argue every possible issue, and judges to discuss

every argued issue, this economy may be illusory.
147. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
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little protection may fail to provide authors with sufficient incentive
to create. Too much, however, may cut new authors off from the
ability to use and develop stock and "necessary" material on an equal
basis.
Some borrowing - building on the creativity of the past - is both
inevitable and desirable. Copyright must perform the difficult task of
determining how much borrowing is permissible. Ideas are free for
all to use; they are a universal heritage and common store from which
all may draw. They are the raw materials of creation. If ideas are
withdrawn from the public domain, the areas of thought open to exploration will progressively narrow.
Scenes a faire also have a certain universality. Writing without
stock literary devices is possible, but such devices are part of the
universal heritage. Although "necessary" scenes do not provide the
only available path for an author, they do have a connotation of limits.
There may be only a limited number of satisfactory or obvious ways
to deal with a particular situation. 14 Scenes a faire provide a type of
vocabulary. An author who has been exposed to a work containing an
idea or situation should not be forced to avoid one of the most natural
or logical ways of expressing it. Otherwise, the options open to new
authors will be progressively narrowed. Furthermore, avoiding a scene
a faire may be more difficult than creating it. Authors should not be
required to design around an obvious choice, even if others are available.
V.

THE MEANING OF UNPROTECTIBLE

Scenes a faire are often termed uncopyrightable. 149 At first glance,
this seems odd. Some works, such as those that are completely unorig148. A slightly different question of limits can be seen in a case involving beer commercials.
See Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries, Ltd., 452 F. Supp. 429 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
The court stated that "arm wrestling, argument in a tavern, recitation of poetry, and siblings
speaking in unison used in Miller's and Carling's light beer commercials are only ideas or themes
therein and do not constitute expressions subject to copyright protection." Id. at 440. Similarity
was to be expected from competitors selling the same product. Furthermore, a thirty-second
commercial "leaves little room for factual and thematic development whereby a competitor can
place distinguishing features therein to avoid infringing another's ... work." Id. at 441.
149. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 841 (1980); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90-91 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); Wavelength Film Co. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 631 F.
Supp. 305, 306 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Zambito v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 1107, 1110-11
(E.D.N.Y.), affd, 788 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1985); Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1302
(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 738 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984); Davis v. United Artists, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 722,
727 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Barris/Fraser Enters. v. Goodson-Todman Enters., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1887, 1889 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236 (scenes a faire are afforded no
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inal or not fixed in any tangible form of expression, are uncopyrightable. 150 But scenes a faire are ordinarily elements of works that are
both copyrightable and copyrighted. Copyright, however, does not
preclude appropriation of every element of a work; ideas, for example,
may be taken freely. Alexander v. Haley'51 listed other attributes of
a copyrightable work that are not subject to copyright protection.
These include facts, scenes a faire, material traceable to a common
source, and phrases conveying an idea that is expressible only, or at
least typically, in a limited number of stereotyped fashions.152 One can
therefore conceptualize copyright protection as extending only to those
components of a work that are "copyrightable." This "presupposes
that there may be much in what is popularly called a copyrighted
work as to which the statute affords no protection."1
With respect to "uncopyrightable" ideas, Professor Nimmer has
said that the distinction between ideas and expression is not so much
a limitation on the copyrightability of works, as it is a measure of
the degree of similarity which must exist between a copyrightable
work and an unauthorized copy, in order for the latter to constitute
an infringement.' M The same holds true for scenes a faire. Chopping
up a work, taking out bits, and declaring them uncopyrightable is not
a productive way of looking at the problem. The question should not
be whether a scene in the plaintiffs work is protectible in the abstract.
Rather, it should be whether the similarities that exist between plain-

copyright protection); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1159 (1986) (scenes a faire are "not copyrightable except to the extent they are given

unique -

and therefore protectible -

expression in an original creation"); see also Berkic v.

Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985) (scenes a faire not

protected against copying).
150.
151.
152.
153.

17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
460 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Id. at 4546.
Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926). The court said that ideas, including

basic plots, are not copyrightable. It must be determined if anything was appropriated, and
then whether this appropriation was of copyrightable subject matter and was substantial. See
Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986)

(plaintiff must show that similarities relate to copyrightable material); Atari, Inc. v. North Am.
Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616-17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982)

("that a work is copyrighted says very little about the scope of its protection"); Hoehling v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir.) (wrongful appropriation ordinarily
shown by proving substantial similarity of copyrightable expression), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841
(1980).
154. 1 M. NIMER, supranote 26, § 2.03(D). However, Nimmer does refer to "copyrightable
expression." Id. § 2.18(D).
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tiff's and defendant's works are sufficient for infringement - that is,
whether the defendant has copied and improperly appropriated the
plaintiffs work.
A.

Uncopyrightability in the Abstract

The difficulties inherent in declaring scenes a faire uncopyrightable
in the abstract are evident in statements by two courts that "a second
author does not infringe even if he reproduces verbatim the first
author's expression, if that expression constitutes 'stock scenes or
scenes that flow' necessarily from common unprotectible ideas."' 155 But
literal copying is quite different from taking an abstraction.r13 Literal
copying is the quintessential form of copying in copyright, and expression can be readily distinguished from idea. Depriving a new author
of the right to use the exact words of another does not prevent that
author from using a "necessary" scene. 157 If the taking is significant,
155. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984); see Evans v. Wallace Berrie & Co., 681 F. Supp. 813, 817
(S.D. Fla. 1988).
156. When part of a work is copied verbatim or nearly verbatim, Professor Nimmer calls
it "fragmented literal similarity," 3 M. NIIMIMER, supra note 26, § 13.03(A)(2), as opposed to
"comprehensive nonliteral similarity." Id. § 13.03(A)(1). In the case of fragmented literal similarity, the question is the "quantum of... literal similarity permitted without crossing the line
of substantial similarity ...." Id. § 13.03(A)(2). Unfortunately, the difference between literal
and abstract similarity sometimes goes unrecognized. For example, in Walker v. Time Life
Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986) the plaintiff offered
lists of specific alleged similarities, seeking to prove "fragmented literal similarity." However,
these similarities, that the film and book both "begin with the murder of a black and a white
policeman with a handgun at close range [and] both depict cockfights, drunks, stripped cars,
prostitutes, and rats" are abstract similarities, a fact left unrecognized, or at least unmentioned,
by the court. See id.
157. In cases involving such things as practical works and fairly simple pictorial works,
idea and expression come very close together. Based on the need to protect the underlying art
or the limited number of possible variations in expression, some courts have required a showing
of identical or nearly identical reproduction in order to show infringement. Concrete Mach. Co.
v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600 (1st Cir. 1988) (statues of animals); Rachel v.
Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503 (9th Cir. 1987) (synthetic animals); Cooling Systems &
Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 491 (9th Cir. 1985) (sales catalogs); Sid
& Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (animated
television series and a restaurant advertising campaign); Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley,
253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.) (insurance bonds), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958); Dorsey v. Old Surety
Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872, 874 (10th Cir. 1938) (insurance policies); Worlds of Wonder v. Vector
Intercontinental, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 135, 139 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (cassette tapes); Farmers Indep.
Tel. Co. v. Thorman, 648 F. Supp. 457, 461 (W.D. Wis. 1986) (telephone directories); Gaye v.
Gillis, 167 F. Supp. 416, 418 (D. Mass. 1958) (coupon books). Others have found that even
verbatim copying may fail to infringe. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d
738, 741 (9th Cir. 1971) (gold jewel-encrusted pin in the shape of a bee); Morrissey v. Proctor
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then it properly constitutes infringement.15s Courts that have said
otherwise may have been misled by the frequently repeated statement
that scenes a faire are uncopyrightable, meaning unprotectible in the
abstract, into saying that even their verbatim expression is not protected by copyright.
Furthermore, it is difficult to analyze infringement by eliminating
unprotected elements of a work and then comparing protected elements with the defendant's work. One appellate court instructed the
trial comt to look only at those aspects of the plaintiffs work that
were protected expression and copied by the defendant.19 The trial
court was then to determine whether the plaintiff was 'likely to prove,
under the ordinary observer test, that [defendant's] works were substantially similar to its own."' 1 The ordinary observer test requires
substantial similarity to be judged by the spontaneous response of the
ordinary lay observer.161 One cannot, however, react spontaneously
and carefully compare fragmented pieces of a work all at once. Ordinary observers do not look at things that way.
Another court that held scenes a faire and facts to be uncopyrightable recognized a related problem:
We are aware, however, that in distinguishing between
themes, facts, and scenes a faire on the one hand, and
copyrightable expression on the other, courts may lose sight
of the forest for the trees. By factoring out similarities based
on noncopyrightable elements, a court runs the risk of overlooking wholesale usurpation of a prior author's expression. 162
If one dismantles a plot far enough, almost every element is arguably stock or an idea, with the patterning of these elements and the

& Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967) (rules for promotional contest involving participants' social security numbers); Crume v. Pacific Mut. Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 182 (7th Cir.) (insolvent
insurers' reorganization plan), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 755 (1944). Complex fictional works do not
involve the ability to practice any underlying art and involve many possible forms of expression.
158. See Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1159 (1986) (scenes a falre are protectible when given unique expression in an original creation).
159. Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 611 (1st Cir. 1988).
160. Id.
161. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 51 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1159 (1986); see Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966); Peter Pan

Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960); Evans v. Wallace Berrie
& Co., 681 F. Supp. 813, 817 (S.D. Fla. 1988); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 26, § 13.03(E)(1).
162. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 841 (1980).
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language providing its originality and expressiveness. Sufficient similarity in complex and specific patterning evidences infringement. Although copying individual words does not constitute infringement, 163
appropriating their arrangement ordinarily does. Similarly, copying a

particular mixture of elements may be infringement, although copying
any one individual element is not. The ordering and interaction of
situations, characters, and milieu is what comprises a protectible
plot.'- If elements are removed from the plaintiffs work before it is
compared to the defendant's, it is difficult to determine whether this
similarity in patterning exists. 165
In all likelihood, that which the plaintiff calls evidence of substantial
similarity of expression the defendant will characterize as unprotected
ideas and scenes a faire. Such was the case in Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Film Ventures International,'r which involved the motion
picture "Jaws" and a very similar shark-based movie called "Great
White." The films shared the following similarities: (1) a local politician
who, in the interest of local tourism, plays down news of the shark;
(2) a finale in which the shark eats a shark hunter and later dies when
a shark expert detonates something the shark has swallowed; (3) a
demonic shark that attacks people and boats for reasons beyond
hunger; and (4) a shark that attacks a dinghy and consumes the occupant. 167 The defendants argue that eliminating the unprotected ideas
and scenes a faire from "Jaws" would strip the two works of virtually
all similarities. The court rejected the defendants' arguments, and

163.

Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899) (Words are "as little susceptible of private

appropriation as air or sunlight ....
The right is to that arrangement of words which the
author has selected to express his ideas . . . ."); see Jefferys v. Boosey, 10 Eng. Rep. 681, 702

(1854) (Property exists in the order of words, not words, which are analagous to elements of
matter. They are not appropriated unless combined.).
164. See Barris/Fraser Enters. v. Goodson-Todman Enters., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1887,
1891 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (although a television game show was made up of stock devices, an original
selection, organization, and presentation could be protected, just like an original combination
of words); Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) ("It is doubtful whether incidents
per se can become copyrightable literary property, but it does not take many of them, nor much
causal connection thereof, to make what will pass for a plot, or scene, and constitute the action
of a play; and that a scene has literary quality and can be copyrighted, and piracy may consist
in appropriating the action of a play without any of the words, is well settled."); see also supra
notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
165. This sort of similarity is defined by Professor Nimmer as "comprehensive nonliteral
similarity." 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 26, § 13.03(A)(1). It exists when the "fundamental essence
or structure of one work is duplicated in another." Id. It is in this area that it is difficult to
separate ideas from expression. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
166. 543 F. Supp. 1134, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
167. Id. at 1137-38.
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agreed with the plaintiff that the similarities in the basic story line,
major characters, and sequence of events were substantial and infringing. 16G
The temptation is understandably strong to dismiss a claim because
elements in plaintiffs work are uncopyrightable, particularly when a
complaint is patent nonsense. Anderson v. Paramount Pictures
Corp.9 is a particularly egregious case. In Anderson, the two
screenplays were remarkably different.170 The plaintiff apparently
based his claim on the alleged appropriation of the following elements:
(1) two wealthy characters who make a bet and ride around in a
chauffeured limousine; (2) people toasting with champagne; (3) a
character who pretends to be blind with dark glasses and a change
cup; (4) the wealthy bettors bribe the subject of their bet to enter
their limousine; (5) the subject initially thinks the bettors are interested in sex; and (6) wallets containing credit cards, people chewing
gum, houses with fireplaces, men shaving, and passing references to
Harvard, the Russians, and unemployment. 171 The court dismissed the
plaintiffs claim with prejudice.72 Rather than declare those elements
uncopyrightable, however, the Anderson court determined that the
defendant had not infringed. The similarities between the plaintiffs'
and defendants' works either were unprotectible scenes a faire or
random, insignificant elements.173
B.

Using Comparisons

The unprotectibility of scenes a faire is best viewed in terms of
comparisons. The similarities between two works should be reviewed

168. Id. at 1141.
169. 617 F. Supp. 1 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
170. The plaintiffs screenplay High Stakes was a romantic melodrama about a lonely woman
executive in New York City who makes a wager with her best friend. She bets that she can
train an uneducated man in six months to appear sufficiently genuine as an entrepreneur to
fool her company's board of directors. Naturally, she falls in love with her subject. The defendants' motion picture, Trading Places, was about a bet between two wealthy brothers as to
whether a successful executive would become a derelict criminal and whether a derelict criminal
would become a successful executive if they simply traded places. When the subjects learn
about the bet, they become allies and avenge themselves through a commodity market manipulation scheme. The plaintiffs choice of defendants seems an odd one. The screenplay is far
more similar to the (also uninfringing) story of Rhinestone, in which Dolly Parton bets that she
can turn anyone into a successful country and western singer in a limited time and then tries
to do so with Sylvester Stallone.
171. Anderson, 617 F. Supp. at 2-3.
172. Id. at 3.
173. Id. at 2.
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to determine whether one infringes the other. The question is what
effect the lack of protection for scenes a faire has on the protection
copyright grants to the work as a whole. Perhaps some courts, eager
to grant summary judgment against plaintiffs' baseless claims, prefer
the language of copyrightability to that of infringement because substantial similarity has traditionally been considered a factual issue that
does not readily lend itself to summary judgment.174 Recently, however, courts have recognized that summary judgment is appropriate
when similarity exists only in uncopyrightable 7 elements, or when
no reasonable jury could find substantial similarity.'76 Courts need not

174. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 85 (1947); see
Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985); Litchfield
v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); Jason v.
Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774, 777 (C.D. Cal. 1981), affd, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982).
175. The word uncopyrightable is often used very loosely, encompassing entire works that
are uncopyrightable and elements of copyrightable works that are deemed unprotected by the
copyright. I have sought to suggest in this article that the second use of the word is inappropriate.
However, when courts seek to determine whether similarities are in unprotected elements,
rather than whether an element is, in the abstract, unprotected, the problem is less severe.
176. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1159 (1986); Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir.
1983); Barris/Fraser Enters. v. Goodson-Todman Enters., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1887, 1891
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Friedman v. International Television Corp., 644 F. Supp. 46, 47 (E.D.N.Y.
1986); Zambito v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 613 F. Supp. 1107, 1110 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 788
F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1985). Even in the Ninth Circuit, where courts must contend with the confusing,
unworkable two-part test set out in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977), a court may grant summary judgment if no reasonable
jury could find substantial similarity. See Frybarger v. International Business Machs., 812 F.2d
525, 528 (9th Cir. 1987); Berkdc v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 826 (1985); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1052 (1985); See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983); Jason v. Fonda, 526 F.
Supp. 774, 777 (C.D. Cal. 1981), affd, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982). These cases showed a far
more relaxed attitude toward granting summary judgment than did Krofft, which implied that
summary judgment would rarely be appropriate if similarity in idea existed. 562 F.2d at 1166.
The Kroffl court created a two-part test for determining substantial similarity. The determination
of whether there is a substantial similarity in ideas is made by an objective "extrinsic" test,
which permits analytic dissection and expert testimony. Id. at 1164. The determination of
whether there is substantial similarity in expression is made by a subjective "intrinsic" test,
which does not permit analytic dissection or expert testimony. Id. The second part of the test
is not very helpful in cases that involve numerous possibly unprotectible elements, such as facts
and scenes a faire. Although the Ninth Circuit has not repudiated Kroffl, it has made it more
workable by distorting it. This is accomplished by enormously expanding the meaning of idea,
saying that the test for substantial similarity of ideas compares "not the basic plot ideas for
stories, but the actual concrete elements that make up the total sequence of events and the
relationships between the major characters . . . . [It] 'requires a comparison of plot, theme,
dialogue, mood, setting, pace and sequence."' Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir.)
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distort copyright law by converting infringement issues into issues of
copyrightability in order to grant summary judgment to a defendant
in a ridiculous case. The plaintiffs and defendant's works can be compared to determine their similarities. Then the issues of copying and
improper appropriation can be faced.
The process of comparison is not without difficulties. Determining

whether substantial similarity exists is inherently uncertain. With
scenes a faire, the ordinary observer test aggravates this uncertainty,
as two works may look and feel very much alike even in the absence

of copying or improper appropriation. 177 It is easy to say that if
similarity exists only in abstractions of scenes a faire, not in their
patterning and language, then the defendant has not infringed. Unfortunately, it is difficult to sift out for comparison only the protected
material, particularly where nonprotectible similarities pervade. 178
Furthermore, even similarities in patterning should not always

support a finding of infringement. The author of a work
[w]here various incidents, in themselves common literary
property, are grouped to form a particular story, must be
confined, in his claim to copyright, close to the story he has
thus composed . . .. [Alnother author, who, by materially
varying the incidents, materially changes the story, should

not be held to be an infringer.'7-

The same principle applies to "necessary" scenes. The similarity in

patterning must exist at a high level of complexity and specificity,
well beyond that which arises from the logic of the situation.10

(quoting Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052
(1985)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985); see Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774, 777 (C.D. Cal.
1981), affd, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982).
177. See Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 329 F. Supp. 601, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
There, the court stated that the jury, although instructed to disregard similarities that were
necessary, incorrectly found for the plaintiff, probably because of the difficulty in sifting out
the protectible material. Id. Courts also have difficulties with this process. The court in McCulloch
v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1987), comparing all elements of the work,
including the unprotectible ones, decided that a decorative red plate with a floral design bearing
the phrase "You Are Special Today" in white was infringed by a white plate with a different
floral design and the same phrase in red letters. The court seemed to find infringement based
on the total look and feel of the two plates, ignoring the fact that the look and feel were the
same because both used the same unprotectible elements. See id. at 319-21.
178. Bevan, 329 F. Supp. at 607.
179. Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 24 (9th Cir. 1933).
180. This requirement can be met, as it was in the case involving Jaws and Great White.
See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
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Despite these problems, the scenes a faire doctrine serves a useful
function when it is used to determine whether substantial similarity
exists between plaintiffs and defendant's works. It avoids the underprotection that might occur if scenes a faire were considered "uncopyrightable" in the abstract. It also avoids the overprotection that
might result if infringement were judged solely on the basis of the
look and feel of two given works.
VI. CONCLUSION

Scenes a faire are often unoriginal. The defendant frequently has
not copied at all or has copied only the plaintiffs ideas. The scenes a
faire doctrine, however, is more than a response to these two facts.
It recognizes that when scenes a faire are involved, even similarities
in expression that are the product of copying should not always be
actionable.
Scenes a faire include stock scenes, scenes that arise naturally
from the logic of a situation, and perhaps a few rare scenes that are
inexpressible in any other way. These diverse strands can be woven
together. Scenes a faire are elements of creation, a vocabulary needed
to create a work. Perhaps no one element, like no one word, is truly
essential. As these elements are withdrawn from use, however, the
store of raw materials available for creation gradually diminishes. This
potential danger justifies the scenes a faire doctrine, which declares
these elements unprotectible by copyright.
Courts frequently recite the phrase "scenes a faire" formulaically,
without thought or analysis. But if the doctrine is used to determine
whether there has been copying and improper appropriation, it provides a useful tool. If similarities exist solely in scenes a faire, infringement should not be found unless there are highly complex and specific
similarities in patterning. The scenes a faire doctrine provides a useful
brake on the natural tendency to find infringement when works look
and feel very much alike. It provides a clearer standard than the
idea/expression dichotomy, and provides support and guidance to nervous or uncertain courts.
Without the scenes a faire doctrine, later authors might be required
to design around the most satisfactory, natural, or logical choices.
Like the idea/expression dichotomy, the scenes a faire doctrine helps
strike a balance between the need to protect past creations and the
need to encourage new ones.
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